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Does Electoral Competition Curb Party Favoritism?†
By Marta  Curto-Grau, Albert  Solé-Ollé, and Pilar  Sorribas-Navarro*
We study whether incumbents facing uncontested elections channel 
public spending toward  co-partisan officials more than is the case of 
incumbents that are worried about reelection. We draw on data on 
capital transfers allocated by Spanish regions to local governments 
during 1995–2007. Using a regression discontinuity design, we 
document strong and robust effects. We find that a mayor belonging 
to the party of the regional president obtains twice the amount in 
grants received by an opposition’s mayor. This effect is much greater 
for regional incumbents that won the previous election by a large 
margin, but it disappears for highly competitive elections. (JEL D72, 
H76)
Political favoritism describes situations in which politicians “allocate goods and services disproportionately to population subgroups, variably identifiable by 
race, ethnicity, or partisanship” (Golden and Min 2013, 74). Jointly with corruption, 
political favoritism constitutes a major political risk of government intervention 
(Glaeser 2012). Because of political favoritism, spending allocations deviate from 
the normative principles that should otherwise guide them, reducing citizen welfare 
and hampering economic growth.1 Likewise, party favoritism describes situations 
in which officials affiliated to the incumbent party are able to attract disproportion-
ate benefits from the public budget. Representatives of the majority party in par-
liament might obtain more local public goods for their districts, while  co-partisan 
mayors might receive more intergovernmental transfers. In all these cases, 
“… hierarchical networks of party officials (factions) work to direct local public 
goods to their constituencies and thereby win votes and advance their careers within 
the party” (Persico, Pueblita, and Silverman 2011, 242). In other words,  lower level 
politicians obtain more resources from a fellow,  higher level party official because 
1 For example, ethnic favoritism has been identified as a major impediment to development in Africa (Easterly 
and Levine 1997). Other authors have documented the negative effect of favoritism on aid effectiveness (Dreher 
et al. 2013) and on stimulus spending (Wright 1974). 
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they are expected to help her retain office, and they are happy to provide support at 
election time as they too have expectations of future promotion.
But how can political favoritism be curbed? It is an old assumption that gov-
ernments are held accountable to the citizens through the electoral process. An 
incumbent’s desire for reelection should ensure that she does not deviate from 
the constituents’ interests and focus on a too narrow segment of the population. 
However, this only holds true if certain conditions are met. For example, Hodler and 
Raschky (2014) show that regional favoritism (i.e., the tendency to benefit the polit-
ical leader’s region of birth) is stronger in countries with weak political institutions 
and low education levels. There is also some evidence that information and political 
participation help curb ethnic favoritism (see Fujiwara and Wantchekon 2013). And, 
more importantly as far as this paper is concerned, several studies suggest that polit-
ical favoritism flourishes when there are no elections or when elections are uncom-
petitive. Clear evidence of this is provided by Burgess et al. (2015), who show 
that ethnic favoritism, as reflected in expenditure on road building in Kenya, was 
high in autocratic periods, but disappeared in periods with free elections. Similarly, 
Trounstine (2006) shows that US city mayors facing uncontested elections tend to 
target core supporters at the expense of the larger community when allocating public 
spending.
In this paper, we examine the effects of electoral competition on party favoritism 
when allocating earmarked capital transfers to local governments. We consider this 
setting to be highly suited to the study of party favoritism and its relation to electoral 
competition for several reasons. First, intergovernmental transfers of this kind are 
especially vulnerable to party favoritism. These transfers provide funds that have to 
be spent in a very limited range of areas as determined by the grantor. Second, these 
transfers fund services that are the joint responsibility of two layers of government. 
This means that voters have to split any political credit for the service or facility 
financed between two incumbents. When a  co-partisan (the opposition) controls the 
local government, a transfer enhances (reduces) the popularity of the mayor, while 
reducing (enhancing) that of the opposition candidate (see e.g., Arulampalam et al. 
2009). This suggests that intergovernmental transfers can be used to help  co-partisan 
mayors win competitive races. Third, incentives to engage in party favoritism can 
also depend on how close the  higher level election race is. When the  higher tier 
incumbent is at risk of losing an immediate election, we can expect her to focus on 
strategies that are more productive in the short run, such as targeting constituencies 
with many swing voters.2
The goal of this paper, therefore, is to determine whether the amount of party 
favoritism shown in the allocation of transfers to local governments is not so great 
when the  higher layer government (i.e., the grantor) faces contested elections. We 
present a simple theoretical model that predicts this heterogeneous effect. In the 
model, a  higher level incumbent allocates transfers to local governments with the 
aim of maximizing her probability of staying in power. The incumbent has to decide 
2 The literature on  pork barrel politics has traditionally focused on other tactics, namely, the targeting of spend-
ing to either “swing” (e.g., Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, and Dixit and Londregan 1996) or “core” supporter districts 
(e.g., Cox and McCubbins 1986). 
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whether to allocate more transfers to  co-partisan mayors facing close elections (and, 
thus, increase the pool of aligned mayors) or to spread the money across all districts 
in order to maximize her probability of reelection. When  higher level elections are 
uncompetitive, the incumbent uses her advantage to pursue the first objective.3
We test these predictions using information on capital transfers from regional 
to local governments in Spain. Several papers to date have documented the fact 
that party favoritism in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers is quantita-
tively important. Using US data, Grossman (1994); Larcinese, Rizzo, and Testa 
(2006); and Berry, Burden, and Howell (2010) find some evidence that states and 
districts aligned with the federal government do receive more funds. Arulampalam 
et al. (2009) quantify this difference as representing 16 percent in the case of 
 federal-to-regional transfers in India.  Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni, and Weingast (2003) 
find, in the case of Mexico, that under the PRI, the states controlled by this party 
received up to 40 percent more transfers than those controlled by the opposition. 
Similarly,  Solé-Ollé and  Sorribas-Navarro (2008) and Brollo and Nannicini (2012) 
look at capital transfers to municipalities and report increases of around 30 and 40 
percent for Spain and Brazil, respectively.
However, none of these papers studies the effect of the competitiveness of  higher 
level elections nor do they provide any evidence as to why a given degree of party 
favoritism is observed.4 One reason for this might be that these papers use data for 
a single  high-tier government (usually the federal government during one or a few 
elections), making it impossible to estimate heterogeneous effects. In this paper, we 
make use of a newly compiled database on transfers from Spanish regional govern-
ments (the  so-called Autonomous Communities, ACs from now on) during three 
terms of office for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities. Thus, we can analyze 
whether party favoritism depends on certain characteristics of the ACs and, in partic-
ular, we are able to test the hypothesis that the probability of the regional incumbent 
losing office does genuinely matter. Spain is particularly well-suited to studying this 
question given that there is substantial variability in the intensity of electoral com-
petition at the regional level, both in the  cross section and over time.
In order to identify the effect of party favoritism, we use a regression discontinuity 
(RD) design for close elections, comparing municipalities in which the ideological 
bloc of the regional incumbent won or lost the previous local election by a nar-
row margin. The effects estimated in some of the aforementioned papers (employ-
ing either OLS or “ difference-in-differences” methods) might be biased due to the 
omission of  time-varying electoral support for the incumbent. Brollo and Nannicini 
(2012), Migueis (2013), and Bracco et al. (2015) improve on this by using RD, as is 
now customary in papers examining the effects of parties on policy outcomes (see, 
e.g., Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004;  Pettersson-Lidbom 2008; Ferreira and Gyourko 
2009; and Meyersson 2014). Employing a RD design in a PR system is challenging, 
3 A similar dynamic  trade-off is modeled in Joanis (2011). In that paper the incumbent decides whether to target 
“swing” voter districts to win the present election or “core” voter districts to keep loyal voters motivated. 
4 Likewise, only a few papers examine the effect of electoral competitiveness on pork barrel politics. 
Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) analyze whether the tendency to favor “core” over “swing” districts in the United 
States is mediated by  state-level electoral competition, but find no evidence of this. In addition, Joanis (2011) looks 
at the effects of electoral competition on the allocation of revenues for roads in Canada and finds no effect. 
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but a number of recent studies have clearly established the steps to follow (see Folke 
2014, for the seminal paper, and also Ade and Freier 2013; Fiva and Halse 2016; and 
Fiva, Folke, and Sørensen 2018). We adapt this methodology to the Spanish context. 
We follow these papers and define our treatment (i.e., alignment) as a situation in 
which the ideological bloc to which the regional president belongs has a majority 
of seats in the local council. We use a forcing variable based on a calculation of the 
votes that the regional president’s bloc must lose (gain) at the local election in order 
to lose (gain) the majority of seats on the council.
What we find is striking. The RD estimates suggest that Spanish local govern-
ments controlled by the same party as the regional government receive, on average, 
102 percent more funds for capital transfers than are received by similar municipali-
ties controlled by the opposition. These results represent unequivocal evidence of an 
extreme degree of party favoritism in the allocation of capital transfers. The align-
ment effect found means that, on average, municipalities could increase their capital 
spending by 21 percent. More importantly, the competitiveness of  regional-level 
elections influences these biases in the allocation of transfers. According to our 
results, the level of party favoritism for the regions with less competitive elections is 
much higher (nearly twice the average treatment effect), while the treatment effect 
virtually disappears in the case of the more competitive regional elections. This 
effect survives many robustness checks and alternative specifications. Moreover, 
although a simple “ difference-in-differences” estimator delivers lower average 
treatment effects, the relative effect of regional electoral competitiveness remains. 
Therefore, our results provide strong evidence that electoral competition at the 
regional level mitigates the degree of party favoritism in the allocation of intergov-
ernmental transfers.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we present a simple theoreti-
cal model that generates the prediction that party favoritism is greater when regional 
elections are uncompetitive. Section II provides the institutional background to the 
Spanish case. Section III describes the empirical methodology. Section IV presents 
the results and the last section concludes.
I. Theoretical Framework
In this section, we present a theoretical model that helps us derive our main 
hypothesis: when the regional incumbent perceives a higher probability of losing 
office (i.e., electoral competition is high), the degree of party favoritism in the allo-
cation of transfers is lower. The reason our model makes this prediction is that, 
when allocating transfers across local municipalities, the regional incumbent faces 
a tradeoff between trying to win the current  regional-level election and maximizing 
the number of aligned mayors. To maximize her probability of winning the regional 
election, the incumbent must spread transfers across all municipalities, while to 
maximize the number of mayors she must concentrate on those with a narrow major-
ity, favoring  co-partisan mayors and undermining those of the opposition. When 
regional elections are highly competitive, the regional incumbent allocates transfers 
without discrimination, with the aim of maximizing her vote. However, when the 
regional incumbent feels safe, she can forget about having to win more aggregate 
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votes and can focus on seeking to switch the outcome in those municipalities where 
the opposition has a narrow majority.
Model Layout.— The model comprises two tiers of government: regional and local. 
We assume there is one regional government and N local governments. Citizens cast 
their vote separately at local and regional elections that take place simultaneously on 
time. They select the party to rule at each tier by choosing between two candidates. 
At both contests, voters decide whether to reelect the incumbent (i.e., the regional 
president or the mayor, depending on the election) or to replace her with the chal-
lenger. In making such decisions, voters take into account the utility derived from 
transfers allocated from the regional to the local government. Per capita transfers to 
local government i are denoted by  τ i , the voter’s utility function  u( τ i ) is assumed to 
be concave (i.e.,  u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0 ) and the marginal utility is assumed to be linear 
(i.e.,  u′′′ = 0 ).
Voters split the credit from  transfer-related utility between the regional and the local 
incumbent in proportions  (1 − θ) and  θ , respectively (see Arulampalam et al. 2009), 
with  0 ≤ θ ≤ 1 . The vote for the regional incumbent’s party at these two elections 
in municipality i can be expressed as follows:
(1a)  v i r,1 =  ρ r  v i r,0 +  (1 − θ) u ( τ i ) +  ε i r,
(1b)   v i ℓ,1 =  ρ ℓ  v i ℓ,0 + θ (2  a i − 1) u ( τ i ) +  ε i ℓ ,
where  v i 
r,1 and  v i 
r,0 are the vote margin (i.e., the vote share minus one-half) obtained 
by the regional incumbent’s party in municipality i at the regional elections (denoted 
by r) held in periods 1 (the next election) and 0 (the previous election); and  v i ℓ,1 and 
v i 
ℓ,0 are the vote margin obtained by the regional incumbent’s party in municipality 
i at the local elections (denoted by  ℓ ) held also in periods 1 and 0. The coefficients 
ρ r and  ρ ℓ measure the degree of persistence of vote decisions. The terms  ε i r and  ε i ℓ 
are random popularity shocks at the regional and local elections, respectively, dis-
tributed  N(0,  σ r ) and  N(0,  σ ℓ ) , which are assumed to be independent of each other.
The term  (1 − θ) u(  τ i ) in equation (1a) captures the effect of transfers on the 
vote for the regional incumbent at the regional elections: voters are willing to reward 
the regional incumbent in exchange for the utility derived from the transfers she 
allocated to the municipality, in proportion to the responsibility for the quality of 
the service attributed to the regional government, measured by  (1 − θ) . The term 
 θ (2  a i − 1) u(  τ i ) in equation (1b) captures the effect of transfers on the vote for 
the candidate of the regional incumbent at the local elections. Note that now the 
 transfer-derived utility is multiplied by the term   θ (2  a i − 1) , which depends on 
the proportion of responsibility attributed to the local government,  θ , but also on 
whether the local and the regional incumbent belong to the same party (i.e.,  a i = 1) 
or to different parties (i.e.,  a i = 0 ). For a mayor belonging to the regional incum-
bent’s party, the effect of transfers on the vote at local elections is  θu(  τ i ) , whereas 
when the mayor belongs to the regional opposition party the effect of transfers is 
 − θu(  τ i ) . For the regional incumbent, assigning transfers to a local government 
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 controlled by the opposition will harm the vote record of the opposition candidate 
at the local elections.
We consider that a regional incumbent might pursue two goals. First, she might 
seek to maximize the probability of winning the current regional election. Second, 
she might want to maximize the number of aligned mayors, with the purpose of 
building political capital and increasing the chances of winning future regional elec-
tions. An objective function combining these two goals can be expressed as
(2)    max 
 τ i 
 {Pr ( ∑ i
  ρ r  v i r,0 +  (1 − θ) u ( τ i ) >  ε i r)  
 + η  ∑ 
i
 Pr ( ρ ℓ  v i ℓ,0 + θ (2  a i − 1) u ( τ i ) >  ε i ℓ ) − c ( ∑ i  τ i ) } . 
The first part of this expression is the probability of wining the current regional 
election, which depends on the summation of votes across municipalities. The sec-
ond part is the number of mayors belonging to the regional incumbent’s party, which 
depends on the summation of the probabilities of winning each local election. The 
parameter η is a coefficient that depends both on the amount of political capital 
provided by mayors (i.e., how crucial it is to have the mayors’ support during future 
 regional-level campaigns) and on a discount factor (i.e., how important are future 
versus current regional elections). The term  c ( ∑ i 
 
  τ i )   is a convex function (i.e.,  c′ > 0 
and  c′′ > 0 ) that accounts for the opportunity costs of resources, and the marginal 
cost is assumed linear (i.e.,  c′′′ = 0 ).
We can express the probability expressions in (2) as
(3a)  Pr ( ∑ i
  v i 
r,1 > 0) = Φ ( 
 v ̄r,0 + (1 − θ)  ∑ i 
 
u(  τ i )___________________  
 √  N
 ) =  Φ 
r ,
(3b)  ∑ 
i
 Pr ( v i ℓ,1 > 0) =  ∑ 
i
 Φ ( v i ℓ,0 + θ(2  a i − 1 ) u(  τ i )) =   ∑ 
i
  Φ i ℓ , 
where, to simplify the notation, we set  ρ r =  ρ ℓ = 1 and  σ r =  σ ℓ = 1,   and where 
Φ r is the cumulative distribution function of  ∑ i 
 
  ε i r, which, by the convolution for-
mula, is distributed as  N(0,  √ 
_
 N  σ r ) , and  Φ i ℓ   is the cumulative distribution function 
of  ε i ℓ . Note that  Φ r depends on the average margin of victory at the regional elections 
( v ̄r,0 ), while  Φ i ℓ   does not. Note also that while  Φ r is the same across localities,  Φ i ℓ   
depends on the local margin of victory ( v i ℓ,0 ) and on the alignment status  ( a i ) .
Results.—Plugging (3a) and (3b) into (2) and maximizing with respect to  τ i , we 
obtain the following  first-order condition:
(4)  Γ =  (μ (1 − θ) ϕ r + ηθ (2  a i − 1) ϕ i ℓ ) u′ ( τ i ) − c′ ( τ i ) = 0, ∀i,  
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where  μ = 1/ √ 
_
 N and  ϕ = Φ′ is the density function of the standard normal. This 
condition says that the net marginal benefit of allocating transfers should be the 
same across localities.5 We derive the following results.
PROPOSITION 1: Party favoritism at close local elections: provided credit spill-
overs exist ( θ > 0) and mayors’ political capital is valuable ( η > 0), in close local 
elections (i.e., when  v i ℓ,0 = 0 ) aligned mayors will receive more transfers than 
unaligned mayors:
(5)  τ a −  τ u |  v i ℓ,0 =0 > 0 ,
where a stands for aligned and u for unaligned. 
To understand why this is the case note from (4) that  ϕ i ℓ is multiplied by  ηθ and 
–ηθ in the aligned and unaligned cases, respectively, thus creating a wedge between 
the marginal benefits of transfers to these two types of municipalities (see the proof 
in the online Appendix). This result was previously reported in Brollo and Nannicini 
(2012), albeit with a slightly different specification.6
PROPOSITION 2:  Regional-level electoral competition and party favoritism: the 
lower the degree of  regional-level electoral competition (i.e., the larger the previ-
ous margin of victory    v ̄r,0 ), the higher the degree of party favoritism at close local 
elections:
(6)  
∂ ( τ a −  τ u ) 
 _________
∂ v ̄r,0 
 |  v i ℓ,0 =0 > 0 .
This occurs because as  v ̄r,0 decreases the regional incumbent becomes more 
focused on winning the regional election and less focused on winning a greater 
number of local elections. Because of this, transfers are spread out to all units, inde-
pendently of the party to which the mayor belongs.7 This result is new in the litera-
ture and provides the main empirical prediction we aim to test.
Hypotheses.—The model predicts that, when regional elections are not too 
competitive, the regional incumbent will allocate more transfers to aligned than 
to unaligned mayors that won the local elections by a narrow margin. The model 
5 To guarantee a maximum, we assume that the incentives arising from local elections are not too great relative 
to those arising from regional elections. This ensures that the  second-order condition is negative (i.e., both for 
aligned and unaligned municipalities). 
6 The model also predicts that the alignment effect vanishes as local elections become uncompetitive, that is, as 
v i 
ℓ,0 goes to 1 or −1. So, this model predicts that the effect of alignment at close elections is greater than the effect 
averaged across all elections. 
7 As  v ̄r,0 decreases, the marginal benefit curves of aligned and unaligned units become steeper, making the use 
of transfers more interesting. However, for a given transfer level, the difference in the marginal benefit of transfers 
to these two types becomes smaller, making discrimination less appealing too. See the formal proof in the online 
Appendix. 
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also predicts that the lower the level of electoral competition at the regional level, 
the greater the difference in the amount of transfers allocated to aligned versus 
unaligned mayors that won the local elections by a narrow margin.
The fact that these predictions are conditional on local elections being close has 
implications for identification. This is what justifies the use of RD to estimating 
the jump in transfers at the threshold (i.e., when  v i ℓ,0 = 0 ). RD has the advantage 
of providing an estimate that can be credibly interpreted as causal. Note, however, 
that the RD only identifies the effect of alignment at close elections (i.e., the local 
average treatment effect or LATE). However, the model also predicts differences in 
transfers between aligned and unaligned governments far from the threshold. This 
means that according to the model, the average treatment effect (ATE) should be 
lower than the LATE. In order to assess whether this is the case, we also provide 
“ difference-in-differences” estimates for the ATE. Of course, since it is more diffi-
cult to interpret the DinD estimates as causal, we subject these results to additional 
reliability tests, and even then, we are cautious in our interpretation.
II. Institutional Context
A. Local Government Finances
The Spanish government comprises three layers: central, regional, and local. 
There are seventeen regional governments, the  so-called Autonomous Communities 
(ACs), which have fairly  wide-ranging spending responsibilities. Spain’s local layer 
consists of over 8,000 municipalities, most of which are relatively small. These 
municipalities are multipurpose governments, with major expenditure categories 
corresponding to the traditional responsibilities assigned to the local public sector 
(e.g., environmental services, urban planning, etc.). Current spending is financed 
out of the municipalities’ own revenues (two-thirds) and unconditional grants 
(one-third). The latter are allocated according to a formula, which hinders their use 
for  pork barrel politics. However, the funding of capital spending is heavily depen-
dent on grants, which in 2008 represented 38 percent of local investment. Capital 
spending represents 21 percent of total spending and, thus, capital transfers repre-
sent 8 percent (= 21 percent × 0.38) of total nonfinancial revenues.
Capital grants to municipalities are transferred primarily from the regional layer 
of government (54 percent). There are two rationales for these grants. The first is the 
overlapping of responsibilities between regional and local governments. Regions 
use transfers to advance their policy objectives while not having to worry about the 
problems of implementation. The second is the ability to assist needy local gov-
ernments. These transfers take the form of “project grants:” an open call is made 
at regular intervals and a municipality can apply by submitting its infrastructure 
projects (e.g., street and road paving, sewage systems and water pipes, etc.). These 
are evaluated according to previously established criteria (typically published in the 
call), but which are subject to the interpretation of the grantor. The call often does 
not specify clearly the weight attached to each of the criteria, or it fails to specify the 
link between the score assigned to each criterion and an objective variable, leaving 
this very much at the discretion of the grantor.
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There is anecdotal evidence that the allocation of these regional transfers has 
been subject to political manipulation in Spain. The following Internet posts are 
illustrative of partisanship in transfer allocation in two different regions:
The government of Valencia allocates all transfers on the basis of par-
tisanship instead of adhering to objective criteria, never in accordance 
with the needs of the municipalities (…) year after year there is dis-




The other problem [with transfers] is the ‘ old-boy network’ and the ‘par-
tisanship’ of grantors. (…) Having a ‘friend in the right place’ and being 
a ‘member of the party’ weigh much more heavily than they should in the 
awarding of transfers. (https://blocs.mesvilaweb.cat/sbaulida/?p=84854 
03/10/2008)
There is also some evidence that the different agents involved do care about who 
receives the credit for the facilities built with these transfers. For instance, in 2009, 
when the Spanish socialist government, as part of a stimulus package, decided to 
allocate capital transfers on a per capita basis, many socialists in opposition at the 
local level complained about how this would harm their electoral prospects at the 
next municipal elections. Similarly, the central government sought to get the political 
credit for these stimulus transfers by ordering the installation of huge billboards on the 
public work sites stating clearly that the central government was responsible for the 
program. All this evidence supports the  credit-claiming mechanism, which explains 
why the regional incumbent is interested in discriminating in favor of aligned mayors.
B. Regional and Local Politics in Spain
Regional Politics.— Elections to the regional parliament are held every four years. 
Voters choose between several party lists, and the electoral system is based on the 
d’Hondt rule with a threshold. Representatives elect the regional president by simple 
majority and she, in turn, decides the composition of the Cabinet. Around a third 
of the incumbents sit in minority or coalition governments. Coalitions tend to form 
along ideological lines, albeit with a few exceptions. There are three national parties 
that run in all regions: PSOE (the main party on the left), PP (the only national party 
on the right), and IU (the former communists). There are also many regionally based 
parties, some on the left and some on the right. Some of these parties seldom cross 
ideological bloc lines. Other parties are able to reach agreements with both the left 
and the right. In any case, the vast majority of regional presidents belong to the PSOE 
and the PP (36 and 51 percent, respectively, in our sample). Regionalist parties held 
the regional presidency in the rest of the cases (13 percent). We take these character-
istics into account in our analysis (see Tables A.7 and A.8 in the online Appendix).
Most regional elections and local elections are concurrent (i.e., held on exactly 
the same day). This happens in 12 out of the 15 regions in our sample, meaning that 
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only in 3 regions regional and local elections are staggered (in Galicia, Catalonia, 
and Andalusia). In this latter group, the lapse between local and regional elec-
tions is between one and two years, suggesting that even in this case the regional 
incumbent might care about the competitiveness of future regional elections. In 
any case, we use all regional elections in order to obtain our main results. We also 
examine whether these are robust to the exclusion of the regions with staggered 
elections.
Local Politics.—Local elections are held every four years on the same day 
throughout all the Spanish municipalities. Voters choose between several closed 
party lists. The electoral system is a proportional one, votes being allocated to 
seats using the d’Hondt rule with a 5 percent vote threshold. After that the mayor is 
elected by a simple majority of the council (see Colomer 1995). The council oper-
ates as a small representative democracy, and has to reach a majority vote to pass 
the initiatives and regulations proposed by the mayor, who acts as the  agenda-setter. 
Mouritzen and Svara (2002) classify Spanish mayors as “strong mayors,” meaning 
“the elected mayor is in control of the majority of the city council and in full charge 
of all executive functions.” Moreover, the discipline enforced by Spain’s political 
parties means that the chances of amending the mayor’s proposals are low when the 
mayor’s party or coalition controls a majority of the seats.
The fairly large proportion of minority or coalition governments is undeniable 
(around one-third during the terms analyzed here), although most of these coali-
tions are formed along ideological lines. There are, of course, some exceptions to 
this rule. For instance, when a regionalist party crosses the ideological border and 
supports a regional president of a different ideology, this generates some pressure 
on their local  co-partisans to do the same and to support the candidate for mayor 
belonging to the president’s party. Moreover, the platforms of the few local parties 
tend to be based solely on local issues, so they are under less pressure to reach an 
agreement on ideological grounds or because of pressure from higher party ranks. 
We show that the results are robust to different ways of dealing with these parties. 
Note, in any case, that these two problems are of no quantitative relevance. As in the 
case of regional governments, most mayors belong to the PSOE or the PP (48.5 and 
37.5 percent, respectively, in our sample). Regionalist parties only held 10.6 percent 
of mayoralties and this figure is much lower for regionalist parties crossing ideolog-
ical lines (1.6 percent). The percentage of local parties holding the mayoralty is also 
low (3.4 percent).
III. Empirical Design
A. RD and PR Systems
Studies adopting observational approaches to estimate the effect of party ideol-
ogy on votes and policy outcomes may suffer from an omitted variables problem: 
party control can be correlated with an incumbent’s popularity and this, in turn, 
might impact the outcome variable. To deal with this problem some papers have 
recently adopted the “close-race” regression discontinuity design (RD) framework 
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(see Lee 2008; Lee, Moretti, and Butler 2004;  Pettersson-Lidbom 2008; Ferreira 
and Gyourko 2009; Gerber and Hopkins 2011; Folke 2014; Meyersson 2014). The 
reasoning underpinning this method is that elections won by a narrow margin are, in 
practice, very similar events to elections lost by a similarly narrow margin.
The fact that local councils are elected in Spain using  party-list proportional rep-
resentation (PR) precludes the use of a traditional RD. The first challenge posed 
by such institutional setting is that sometimes no single party holds a majority of 
seats in the council, which means that the mayor has to be supported by a coalition 
of parties. The second challenge concerns the difficulties in identifying the vote 
threshold at which an additional vote switches a seat from one party to another (and, 
thus, from the coalition supporting the mayor to the opposition). Here, we follow the 
solution proposed by recent studies that have adapted the RD methodology to a PR 
system (see Folke 2014 among others).
First, provided that ideology is a very powerful driver of coalition formation, we 
define our treatment as a situation in which the ideological bloc of the party of the 
regional president has a majority of seats at the local council. So, when parties on the 
left of the ideological spectrum have a majority of seats, it is highly likely that the 
mayor will also belong to the  left-wing party bloc. If the regional president belongs 
to a  left-wing ( right-wing) party, then we can say that the mayor and the president 
are aligned (unaligned). The same applies when  right-wing parties hold a majority 
of seats. This is exactly the procedure used in Fiva, Folke, and Sørensen (2018), 
and Fiva and Halse (2016). However, the fact that a small proportion of regional 
and local parties are able to support both right- and  left-wing parties means that the 
ideological factor will not always work. In the case of regional parties, we classify 
them as belonging to the ideological bloc of the president, if they support that party 
in the regional parliament. The evidence that regional coalitions tend to reproduce 
at the local level justifies this procedure. In any case, we use a “fuzzy” RDD, as in 
Fiva and Halse (2016), to take into account the fact that ideology does not predict 
with certainty the alignment status.
Second, even if the treatment in terms of the discontinuity of seats is relatively 
straightforward to define, elections won or lost by a difference of one seat are prob-
ably not that close in terms of the number of votes. Thus, using the number or the 
percentage of seats as our forcing variable might not be appropriate (see Fiva, Folke, 
and Sørensen 2018 for a discussion of this point). Instead, we use a forcing variable 
computed as the percentage of votes that the ideological bloc of the regional presi-
dent must lose (win) in order to lose (win) the majority of seats in the council. We 
explain in detail how this procedure works in the following section and in the online 
Appendix (see Tables A.3, A.4, A.5, and A.6).
B. Equation Specification
Average Effects.—The RD analysis involves, as a first step, the estimation of the 
discontinuity of transfers. To do so, we use the following  two-equation model:
(7)  τ it = α  a it + g ( v it 0) +  ε it ,
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(8)  a it = β  d it + h ( v it 0) +  ϵ it ,  ∀  v it 0 ∈  (− h,  h) ,
where  τ it are the per capita capital transfers received by the local government i before 
local election t and    a it = 1 if there is alignment between the regional and the local 
government, and 0 otherwise. The variable  v it 
0 is the percentage of votes in the previ-
ous local elections that the parties in the regional president’s ideological bloc would 
have to lose (if holding the mayoralty) or win (if in the opposition at the local level) 
to lose (win) a majority of seats in the local council, and so lose (win) control of the 
government. This variable is computed using a specific algebraic method developed 
herein. Henceforth, we refer to this variable as the Regional incumbent’s bloc vote 
margin. With  d it = 1 we denote a situation where this vote margin is positive, and 
0 otherwise. The terms  g ( v it 0) and  h ( v it 0) are polynomials in  v it 0, fitted separately at 
either side of the threshold using the observations in a neighborhood around the 
threshold, which we label by h, hereby referred to as the bandwidth.
Equation (7) is used to estimate the effect of partisan alignment on transfers. 
Equation (8) is the first stage used to estimate the discontinuity in alignment that we 
use for identification. We estimate equation (7) by 2SLS, using  d it as an instrument 
for  a it . The estimates obtained can be interpreted as a “Local Average Treatment 
Effect” or LATE (see Lee and Lemieux 2010).
As explained above, we also report the DinD results, given that they may provide 
information about average treatment effects and can, in any case, be used as a back-
ground check. The DinD equation can be expressed as follows:
(9)  τ it =  γ 1  a it +  ∑ 
i
  γ 2i   f i +  ∑ 
t
  γ 3t   f t +  u it ,
where  f i and  f t are municipality and  term-of-office dummies.
Heterogeneous Effects.—The specification in (7) can be modified to analyze the 
heterogeneous effects of interest. In particular, following Becker, Egger, and von 
Ehrlich (2013), we estimate an “Heterogeneous Local Average Treatment Effect” 
(HLATE) interacting our treatment with an indicator of regional electoral competi-
tion. More concretely, we estimate the following equation:
(10)  τ it =  η 1  a it  z rt +  η 2  z rt +  ∑ 
r
  η 3r  a it  f r +  ∑ 
r
  η 4r  f r +  l r ( v it 0) + l ( v it 0 ,  z rt ) +  υ it ,
where  z rt is the level of regional electoral competition (demeaned) and  η 1 is the 
parameter of interest, which indicates how the alignment effect changes as the 
degree of electoral competition deviates from the mean. The terms  a it  f r and  f r denote 
alignment × region fixed effects and region dummies, respectively. The expression 
l r ( v it 0) denotes a  region-specific polynomial and  l ( v it 0 ,  z rt ) is an interaction between 
the polynomial    and  z rt . All the polynomials are fitted separately on each side of 
the threshold (see Table A.9 in the online Appendix for details). The inclusion of 
alignment × region fixed effects in the equation means that the estimation of our 
heterogeneous effects only relies on variation over time in the level of regional 
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competition.8 Intuitively, we estimate how the alignment effect strengthens (loos-
ens) as the level of regional electoral competition decreases (increases) over time.
C. Econometrics
RD Assumptions.—The validity of the RD design rests on certain assumptions 
that have to be tested. First, we document that there is a genuine discontinuity in 
the probability of treatment. We show graphically that this is the case. The jump in 
the probability of treatment is lower than one, and this justifies the use of a “fuzzy” 
design. Second, we show that the forcing variable used is continuous around the 
threshold by inspecting the histogram and using the formal test proposed by McCrary 
(2008). The continuity test provides a means for discarding the manipulation of the 
forcing variable. Third, we also test for the continuity of predetermined covariates 
to show that all factors, besides alignment, that could potentially influence the level 
of transfers are continuous at the threshold.
In order for the RD estimates of the heterogeneous effects to be valid, two addi-
tional assumptions need to be fulfilled (see Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich 2013). 
The first is that the source of heterogeneity ( z rt ) also has to be continuous at the 
threshold. We provide evidence on this. The second assumption is that, conditional 
on the forcing variable, the assignment of the interaction variable has to be random, 
which means that conditional on the polynomial of the vote margin at the local 
elections, municipalities in regions with high- and low-regional electoral compe-
tition should not differ in unobserved factors that may influence the allocation of 
transfers. As we explained above, our main strategy to ensure that the results are 
not driven by the omission of confounding factors of this type is based in using 
Alignment × Region fixed effects. Additionally, we add interactions between align-
ment and  time-varying confounders that one might reasonably think have an influ-
ence on the allocation of transfers and that might be correlated with the evolution of 
regional electoral competition over time.
To validate the DinD results, we perform a falsification test that shows that the 
results are driven by partisan alignment and not by any other confounder that cor-
relates over time with alignment.9 To perform this test, we study whether future 
partisan alignment has an impact on transfers received in the present, controlling for 
present alignment.
Estimation and Inference.—First, our preferred RD estimation uses a local 
polynomial with h equal to the optimal bandwidth,  h ⁎ , computed as per Calonico, 
Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). This bandwidth minimizes the mean squared error. 
We also report the results for other bandwidths:  h ⁎ /2,  h ⁎ /4, and  2h ⁎ . The finding 
that the treatment is also precisely estimated for lower bandwidths would reassure 
our findings. The results reported in the tables are based on the estimation of a 
8 The estimation will deliver the coefficients of each of the Alignment × Region fixed effects (i.e.,  η 3R ). Note that 
the variation in these coefficients does not have a causal interpretation, since they can be correlated with omitted 
variables measured at the regional level. 
9 Ideally, we would like to test the parallel trend assumption. However, our data does not allow performing this 
test. We only have three  cross sections. 
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local linear regression that facilitates later on the specification and estimation of 
the interacted model. As a complementary analysis, we also report the results of 
an RD analysis using a global polynomial. Second, regarding the calculation of the 
standard errors, when we estimate the HLATE, we cluster them at the regional level 
to account for the fact that the interacted variable is also computed at the regional 
level. We account for the fact that we have a relatively small number of clusters by 
reporting  wild-bootstrap  p-values (Cameron and Miller 2015).
D. Sample and Data
Sample.—We use data for Spanish municipalities and regions (i.e., Autonomous 
Communities, ACs). We consider three  cross sections of data, for the terms 
 1996–1999,  2000–2003, and  2004–2007, with around 2,000 municipalities in each 
period. The outcomes of the 1995 election affect transfers in  1996–1999; the 1999 
election influences the  2000–2003 transfers; and the 2003 election has an impact 
on the transfers allocated during  2004–2007. The information comes from a survey 
on budget outlays conducted by the Spanish Ministry of Finance. This database 
includes all municipalities larger than 5,000 residents and a representative sample 
of the rest.10
Transfers.—We focus on capital transfers from regional to local governments in 
the two years preceding the next local election. As explained in Section II, we study 
capital grants because of the greater discretion in their allocation. We expect them 
to matter more in the period running up to local elections. Further, the  two-year 
aggregation helps to reduce the volatility of the variable, and the use of yearly infor-
mation does not provide any statistical advantage, since the alignment status does 
not change between years within these  two-year periods.
Alignment.—The alignment concept used throughout this study can be defined 
as a dummy equal to one when the mayor and the regional president belong to the 
same party ( Mayor-President alignment). We consider that it is in such cases that 
the incentive to avoid losing credit for the transfers allocated is strongest. In the 
robustness checks, we have also sought to verify whether the results are affected by 
the use of more comprehensive alignment definitions: that is, situations in which 
the mayor and/or the main partner of a coalition belong to the same party (Partner 
alignment), and situations in which the mayor and the regional president belong to 
the same ideological bloc (Bloc alignment).11
10 Due to data accessibility problems, the analysis is restricted to 15 regions, excluding the Basque Country and 
Navarra. These are small regions and their exclusion should not represent a problem. Moreover, data availability 
also restricts the sample to municipalities with more than 1,000 residents. 
11 Note that when examining the effect of  Mayor-President Alignment, municipalities with other types of align-
ment are excluded from the sample. Thus, the control group is formed by local governments ruled by a party from 
the regional opposition (either in majority or in coalition). A similar logic applies when examining other types of 
alignment. 
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Forcing Variable.—The forcing variable is the Regional incumbent’s bloc vote 
margin, computed as the votes needed for the ideological bloc of the regional 
incumbent to win (lose) the majority of seats on the local council, expressed as a 
percentage of total votes cast at the local elections. To define the ideological blocs, 
we classify all parties standing at local elections in three groups: left, right, and local 
parties (see Table A.3 and Table A.8 in the online Appendix for further details on the 
classification). Some local parties are difficult to classify. We consider this issue in 
the robustness checks.
We develop an exact algebraic formulation of the forcing variable based on 
the workings of the d’Hondt method, which is used to translate votes into seats 
in Spanish local elections.12 We compute the forcing variable under different vote 
migration scenarios. In our preferred measure (used to present our main results), we 
assume that the votes taken away from the party holding the marginal seat are trans-
ferred only to abstention and not to the parties in the other ideological bloc.13 We 
also assume that negative vote shocks simultaneously affect all the parties within the 
regional incumbent’s ideological bloc, so we subtract votes not just from the party 
holding the marginal seat but from all parties in the bloc in proportion to the initial 
votes received by each party. Intuitively, our method works as if we were subtracting 
small numbers of votes from one of the blocs, distributing these votes between the 
parties of that bloc according to their initial vote share, while keeping the number 
of votes for the parties of the other bloc constant. We stop subtracting votes when 
we observe a shift in the seat majority from one bloc to the other (i.e., when the 
last seat giving the majority to one bloc moves to the other bloc). The number of 
votes needed to reach this stage, divided by the total number of votes, is our forcing 
variable.14
As a robustness check, we also compute the forcing variable using an alternative 
vote migration scenario. We consider that a vote might go (come) not just from (to) 
abstention but also from (to) the other ideological bloc, as well as a combination of 
these two assumptions.15
 Regional-Level Electoral Competition.—Our measures of regional electoral 
competition are based on the difference between the seat shares controlled by the 
regional president and those controlled by the opposition (henceforth, Regional seat 
margin). We use seats instead of votes because regional elections have multiple 
districts and different degrees of proportionality in different regions, which renders 
vote shares meaningless (see e.g., Strom 1989). Note also that the purpose here is 
different to that when we compute the forcing variable with local election data: in 
12 See Table A.4 in the online Appendix for an example of how it is implemented.
13 We believe this assumption to be plausible in Spain given the importance of vote transfers from/to abstention 
during the period of analysis. 
14 In Table A.3 in the online Appendix, we provide the algebraic formulation for the more basic case, i.e., the 
one in which the bloc holding a seat majority has only one seat in excess and it is clear that the next seat to be 
allocated belongs to the opposition bloc. In Table A.5, we provide a numerical example to illustrate how this might 
work in a more complicated scenario (i.e., the seat share difference between government and opposition is larger 
than one). 
15 In Table A.6 in the online Appendix, we provide a numerical example. 
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that case we sought to make treated and control groups comparable, whereas here 
we seek to capture differences across regions.
The three measures we use differ in their degree of inclusiveness of the parties 
supporting and opposing the regional president. In the first measure, we compute 
the Regional seat margin as the difference between the seat share of the parties that 
actually support the regional president in the parliament (i.e., those voting YES in 
the investiture) and the seat share of the parties that do not support the president. 
Here, we include the main parties in the opposition bloc, that is, those parties that 
belong to a different ideological bloc (and voted NO in the investiture). This is 
our preferred measure since it is a much more accurate depiction of the threats the 
different regional governments actually face. In the second measure, we expand 
the definition and include the seats of all the parties included in the two ideological 
blocs; in this case, however, we exclude some parties that are unwilling to vote for 
an ideologically close party for specific reasons (i.e., radical preferences, conflictive 
scissions). The difference between this and the first measure is that, in some cases, 
it expands the seat share of the regional president, since it allows the president to 
count on ideologically close parties that do not actually belong to the ruling coali-
tion (because the party is a  single-party government or because the president chose 
a centrist regionalist party as a partner). The disadvantage of this second measure is 
that it relies on hypothetical rather than on real alliances. The third measure com-
pares the seat shares of the main parties in government and in opposition. Research 
on local government coalition formation in countries with a PR system shows that a 
party’s seat share is the variable that best predicts whether this party is going to win 
control of the government (e.g., Skjæveland and Serritzlew 2010). A shortcoming 
of this variable is that it neglects the fact that, on some occasions, there are parties in 
the opposition bloc that are ideologically close and prone to reaching an agreement 
even without a  pre-electoral coalition.
Our preferred measure is the first one. Thus, we present the detailed results for this 
variable while the others are presented as additional analysis in the online Appendix. 
It is important to note that this variable (as the other two) has enough time variation 
(which is the one used to identify the HLATE in equation (10)). This can be seen in 
Figure 1 that reports a  box-plot both for the “within” and the “between” variation 
in the Regional seat margin. The fact that the “within’ variable is less concentrated 
around the median might help in our case since the interaction variable is a contin-
uous one.16
Control Variables.—In order to provide a further check of the reliability of the 
RD results and to improve the efficiency of our estimates, we also present results 
when controlling for several covariates. The variables included are those already 
used in previous studies ( Solé-Ollé and  Sorribas-Navarro 2008): log(Population), 
Population density, Property tax rate, Assessed property value, and Local debt level. 
See Table A.1 in the online Appendix for the sources of all variables.
16 The  box-plot graph also identifies more potential outliers in the “between” than in the “within” case. In the 
first case there are two elections (in Cantabria) outside the plots’ range while in the “within” case there are five 
(three in Canarias and two in Cantabria). 
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IV. Results
A. Exploring the Discontinuity
Panel A in Figure 2 plots the seat margin of the regional incumbent’s bloc at the 
local elections against its alignment status. The graph shows a considerable jump 
when the ideological bloc of the regional incumbent moves from −1 to +1 seat 














Figure 1. Variation in Regional Seat Margin
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Figure 2. Alignment versus Forcing Variable
Notes: 1995–1999, 2000–2003, and 2004–2007 terms. Alignment Regional-Local = 1 if the 
mayor and the regional president belong to the same party. Regional incumbent’s bloc seat mar-
gin = distance in local council seats to a change in the ideological bloc’s seat majority. Regional 
incumbent’s bloc vote margin = distance in percentage of local election votes to a change in the 
ideological bloc’s seat majority; seats and votes as obtained at the 1995, 1999, and 2003 local 
elections. The dots are bin averages of 5 percent bin size. The solid line represents the predicted 
values of a local linear polynomial smoothing on each side of the threshold. The dashed lines 
are 95 percent confidence intervals. See Table A.1 in the online Appendix for definitions and 
sources.
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The group of municipalities located at the −1 and +1 seat margin values is quite 
large and has considerable internal variability in the popularity of the party of the 
regional incumbent. For this reason, we use the vote margin as the forcing variable, 
computed as the percentage of votes needed for the regional incumbent’s bloc to 
win (lose) a majority of seats on the city council. Panel B in Figure 2 shows the plot 
between this forcing variable and the alignment status. From this figure, we see that 
there is a big jump in the probability of alignment when moving from positive to 
negative values near the threshold. The value of the discontinuity in the first stage 
(i.e., the discontinuity in the probability of alignment) is around 70 percent. The 
results do not depend at all on the bandwidth or on the method of estimation (local 
versus global polynomial).
To test that the forcing variable is not manipulated, we examine its histogram 
and, more formally, we test for the continuity of this variable at the cut-off. Figure 3 
shows no evidence of manipulation. Another validity check involves testing for the 
presence of a discontinuity in the predetermined covariates used as controls and 
further observables that are potential confounders. None of the variables is system-
atically discontinuous at the threshold (see Table A.10 and Figure A.1 in the online 
Appendix). 
B. Partisan Alignment and Transfers
The discontinuity in transfers around the  cut-off is illustrated in Figure 4, which 
shows the plot between capital transfers and the forcing variable. The graph pro-
vides evidence of a clear and sizeable discontinuity around the threshold: munic-
ipalities marginally to the right of the  cut-off (those likely to be aligned) receive 
larger transfers than those marginally to the left (those likely to be unaligned).
Panel A of Table 1 presents the RD estimates of the LATE, which corresponds to 
the second stage of a 2SLS regression, where the dependent variable is capital trans-
fers per capita. The optimal bandwidth  h ⁎ is equal to 19.3 percent, which is similar 
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Figure 3. Continuity of the Forcing Variable
Notes: Dots for the McCrary graph: bin averages of the density of forcing variable (Regional incumbent’s bloc vote 
margin). Computed with McCrary’s (2008) Stata program.
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Figure 4. Capital Transfers versus Regional Incumbent’s Vote Margin
Notes: (i) Regional transfers = capital transfers per capita from the regional to the local govern-
ment during the last two years of the  1995–1999,  2000–2003, and  2004–2007 municipal terms. 
(ii) The dots are bin averages of 5 percent bin size. (iii) The solid line represents the predicted 
values of a local linear polynomial smoothing on each side of the threshold. (iv) The dashed lines 
are 95 percent confidence intervals.
Table 1—Average Effect of Partisan Alignment on Capital Transfers
RD DinD
Global Local Local Local Local
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Panel A. Second stage (dependent variable: capital transfers per capita)
Alignment 98.06 94.79 102.57 86.99 71.70 56.14
(15.71) (13.72) (18.65) (23.40) (31.40) (6.33)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.001] [0.000] [0.049] [0.000]
Panel B. First stage (dependent variable: alignment status)
Regional incumbent’s 0.70 0.71 0.71 0.73 0.72
 bloc seat majority (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) —
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
R2 0.749 0.684 0.610 0.567 0.570 —
Polynomial order 2 1 1 1 1 —
Bandwidth (percent) 100 2h⁎ = 38.6 h⁎ = 19.3 h⁎/2 = 9.65 h⁎/4 = 4.8
Observations 6,050 4,410 2,576 1,383 683 6,050
Notes: 1995–1999, 2000–2003, and 2004–2007 terms. Columns 1–4 in panel A show the second-stage estimates of 
the 2SLS where Regional incumbent’s bloc seat majority (dummy equal to 1 if the regional incumbent’s bloc vote 
margin > 0) is used as an instrument for the Alignment dummy (equals 1 if the mayor and the regional president 
belong to the same party); column 6 shows the difference-in-differences estimates. Panel B shows the first-stage 
estimates of a 2SLS regression where the dependent variable is Alignment. Robust standard errors are in parenthe-
ses, clustered at the municipality level. The figures in brackets show the p-values obtained if we cluster standard 
errors at the regional level and implement wild bootstrapping. RD estimates in columns 2–5 are obtained using 
local linear regressions using different bandwidths 5; the optimal bandwidth is based on the procedure proposed by 
Calonico, Cattaneo, and Titiunik (2014). 
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to other  close-election studies (see, e.g., Meyersson 2014). The 2SLS coefficient 
associated with the optimal bandwidth is around 102 euros and it is very precisely 
estimated. This amount has to be compared with the transfers received by unaligned 
municipalities just at the left of the  cut-off, which are around 100 euros per capita. 
Thus, an aligned municipality would receive, on average, approximately twice per 
capita transfers than a similar unaligned one. The coefficients that we get when 
using smaller bandwidths are a little smaller but also quite sizable and still precisely 
estimated. The local RD results are also robust to the use of nonparametric methods 
and to the inclusion of control variables (see Figure A.2 and Table A.11 in the online 
Appendix).17
Overall, the results are statistically significant, robust, and quantitatively mean-
ingful. The degree of party favoritism in the allocation of these transfers therefore 
seems very high. However, the impact on local public finances is not so great once 
the share of the transfers in local budgets has been accounted for. Transfers from 
regional governments represent 54 percent of the capital transfers received by munic-
ipalities, which in turn represent 20.52 percent of local capital spending. Therefore, 
a 102 percent increase in such transfers would help municipalities increase their 
capital spending by 20.93 percent (= 102 percent × 20.52 percent).
The last column in Table 1 also reports the DinD coefficient. The effect esti-
mated is 51.70 euros and, therefore, much smaller than that obtained when using 
RD. There are two possible explanations for this difference. First, it is less clear that 
the DinD estimates are causal. They could be biased downward. For instance, this 
would happen if local governments switch from being unaligned to aligned after the 
previous local election, and that higher transfers were the cause of this. Second, the 
DinD might be an estimate of the ATE—recall that our model suggests that the ATE 
should be smaller than the LATE.
Column 1 in Table A.13 reports the falsification test performed to validate the 
DinD results. The estimate shows that future alignment does not affect the allocation 
of transfers, while the effect of present alignment remains unchanged. This result 
suggests that it is unlikely that the DinD estimates are downward biased and that the 
more plausible explanation is that the DinD are an estimate of the ATE.
Additionally, in column 2 of Table A.13, we estimate the effect of past align-
ment, conditional on present alignment. The contemporaneous effect of alignment 
remains statistically significant and past alignment has no statistically significant 
effect. This result validates our story. Finding otherwise would mean that alignment 
only has an effect after the election, which does not make much sense if incumbents 
use transfers to buy votes.
C. The Role of Regional Level Electoral Competition
Before presenting the HLATE estimates from equation (10), a clear way to show 
that regional electoral competition can curb party favoritism is to present a graphical 
17 Note also that the global polynomial results are very similar in size. The polynomial of order two is the one 
that maximizes the  goodness-of-fit, but the results are robust to the order of the polynomial chosen (see Table A.12 
in the online Appendix). 
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analysis of the LATE for two subsamples. One includes observations where regional 
electoral competition is above the median (low competition), and the other includes 
observations with regional electoral competition below the median (high competi-
tion). As it can be seen in Figure 5, the difference between the amounts of capital 
transfers allocated to aligned and unaligned municipalities is substantially larger in 
regions where regional political competition is low than in regions where it is high. 
In a region with low (high) political competition, an aligned municipality would 
receive 116.63€ (63.56€) per capita more than an unaligned municipality. These 
amounts have to be compared with the transfers received by unaligned municipal-
ities just at the left of the cut-off, which are 83€ (90€) per capita. Thus, an aligned 
municipality in a region where political competition is low would receive 140 per-
cent more per capita transfers than a similar unaligned one. If regional competition 
were high, an aligned municipality would receive 70 percent more per capita trans-
fers than a similar unaligned one. 
However, as instructive as this analysis might be, it has some limitations. First, 
being a region with a high or a low level of regional electoral competition might be 
correlated with many other regional traits. Second, the efficiency of the estimator 
might be substantially improved by exploiting the whole range of variation in the 
regional competition variable instead of using only a dummy. So, our estimation of 
the HLATE is based on a specification that interacts the alignment with the Regional 
seat margin and that exploits the variation over time in the degree of regional com-
petition in order to wash out the effects of fixed regional traits. Before showing the 
results, we present evidence that the interacting variable (i.e., the Regional seat 
margin) is continuous at the threshold, which is one of the assumptions required for 
the identification of the HLATE. In Figure 6, we show that this is indeed the case. 
The variable is clearly continuous at threshold, as also a more formal test certifies 
(see Table A.10 in the online Appendix).
In Table 2, we present empirical evidence that, when regional incumbents face 
uncontested regional elections, the level of party favoritism in the allocation of 
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Figure 5. Low versus High Competition Regions
Notes: The solid line represents the predicted values of a local linear polynomial smoothing on each side of the 
threshold. Regions are divided into “low” (“high”) competition if the Regional seat margin is above (below) the 
median. The dashed lines are 95 percent confidence intervals.
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transfers increases. The interaction term Alignment × Regional seat margin captures 
this effect. Recall that, since we control for Alignment × Region fixed effects, we 
are only exploiting the variation over time in regional competition. We present the 


















Regional incumbent’s bloc vote margin
Figure 6. Continuity of the Regional Seat Margin
Notes: The dots are bin averages of 5 percent bin size. The solid line represents the predicted 
values of a local linear polynomial smoothing on each side of the threshold. The dashed lines are 
95 percent confidence intervals. The  y-axis plots the variable Regional seat margin, which is the 
difference between the seat shares of the parties in the regional government and those of the par-
ties in the opposition in the last regional election (demeaned).
Table 2—Effect of Regional Electoral Competition on Party Favoritism
RD DinD
Global Local Local Local Local
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Alignment × 8.55 7.24 7.71 12.57 8.04 3.58
 Regional seat margin (2.60) (3.28) (3.62) (4.53) (4.40) (1.61)
[0.000] [0.051] [0.046] [0.000] [0.064] [0.018]
Regional seat margin −0.94 1.56 1.22 0.72 2.69 −0.50
(2.10) (1.41) (1.26) (3.27) (6.66) (1.42)
[0.693] [0.374] [0.381] [0.842] [0.518] [0.740]
Polynomial order 2 1 1 1 1 —
Bandwidth (percent) 100 2h⁎ = 38.6 h⁎ = 19.3 h⁎/2 = 9.65 h⁎/4 = 4.8
Observations 6,050 4,410 2,576 1,342 644 6,050
Notes: In columns 1–5, Alignment is instrumented with seat majority (see Table 1); columns 1–5 include interac-
tions between Alignment and the Regional seat margin variable, and a polynomial of the forcing variable fitted sep-
arately on either side of the zero threshold using the whole sample and also fully interacted with the Regional seat 
margin. Regional seat margin is the difference between the seat shares of the parties in the regional government 
and those of the parties in the opposition in the previous regional election (this variable is demeaned). All columns 
include a full set of Region and of Alignment × Region fixed effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clus-
tered at the regional level. p-values from wild bootstrapping are in brackets.
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with a local polynomial and different bandwidths (optimal and smaller and larger 
than the optimal) and with a global polynomial.
In all cases, the coefficient of the interaction variable (Alignment × Regional seat 
margin) is statistically significant and positive. The more uncontested a regional 
election is, the higher the amount of discrimination we observe. The coefficient of 
the interaction estimated using a local linear regression and the optimal bandwidth 
is 7.71 euros, which indicates that raising the seat share of the regional govern-
ment (i.e., decreasing electoral competition) by 1 standard deviation relative to the 
average translates into a  57-euro per capita (=7.44 × 7.71) increase in the treat-
ment effect, which is equivalent to a 52 percent increase in the HLATE (=57/109). 
Figure 7 plots the RD marginal effects against the value of the Regional seat margin. 
The graph highlights the range of variation in the level of party favoritism: the mar-
ginal effect ranges from 0 to 200 euros from one extreme to the other of the  x-axis, 
with an average of 109.18 In regions with a level of electoral competition 1 standard 
deviation above the average, aligned mayors receive 166 percent more transfers than 
unaligned mayors. This effect falls to 52 percent in regions with a level of electoral 
competition one standard deviation below the average. This heterogeneity may help 
explain better the magnitude of our local average treatment effect compared to that 
reported elsewhere.
18 This has been computed as a weighted average of the Alignment × Region fixed effects and amounts to 
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Figure 7. Marginal Alignment Effect
Note: (i) Estimates correspond to the RD estimates (ii) Regional seat margin is the difference 
between the regional president’s party minus the seat share of the opposition parties in the 
 previous state election (this variable is demeaned).
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The DinD results go in the same direction as the RD estimates. Party favoritism 
increases with the degree of electoral competition at the regional level. The coefficient 
of the interaction is also smaller than in the RD, but still quite sizeable (around 3.5).
D. Time Varying Confounders
In order to check that the heterogeneous effects we report are in fact due to dif-
ferences in the degree of electoral competition, we run similar regressions to those 
in Table 2, but adding interactions between alignment and  time-varying confounders 
(measured at the regional level) that may be correlated with our measure of regional 
electoral competition (Table 3).
In columns  1–3, we explore the possible role of the situation of public finances, 
since it is reasonable to expect that fiscal stress might eventually affect the abil-
ity of the regional government to allocate transfers to municipalities. We include 
interactions with regional revenues per capita (which include revenues coming from 
Table 3—Controlling for Time-Varying Covariates. Local RD Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Alignment × Reg. seat marg. 6.80 7.72 7.53 6.71 8.60 6.56 7.21
(2.90) (3.55) (3.69) (3.80) (3.15) (3.10) (3.01)
[0.032] [0.041] [0.021] [0.114] [0.000] [0.059] [0.021]
Alignment × Revenues p.c. 0.20 0.04
(0.07) (0.18)
[0.210] [0.861]
Alignment × Debt burden −0.71 0.82
(5.50) (4.19)
[0.897] [0.847]
Alignment × Population density −0.01 −1.10
(0.46) (0.39)
[0.982] [0.000]




 × Press circulation p.c. (0.43) (0.46)
[0.077] [0.548]
Alignment −21.22 −24.89
 × Percent educated (13.21) (20.80)
[0.160] [0.336]
Regional seat margin 0.16 1.26 1.27 1.60 1.17 0.62 1.13
(1.16) (1.23) (1.23) (0.99) (1.43) (1.09) (1.272)
[0.920] [0.344] [0.336] [0.132] [0.452] [0.592] [0.428]
Observations 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576 2,576
Notes: Revenues p.c. = current revenues of the regional government per capita (demeaned); Debt burden = regional 
debt burden (principal + interest) as a share of current revenues (demeaned); Population density = average pop-
ulation density of municipalities in the region (demeaned); Tenure in office = dummy equal to one if the regional 
incumbent was not in office the previous term; Press circulation p.c. = newspaper copies per 1,000 inhabitants (in 
the province; demeaned); Percent educated = share of people with primary and secondary education (demeaned). 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses clustered at the regional level; p-values from wild bootstrapping are in 
brackets. All columns include Region and Alignment × Region fixed effects. Revenues p.c., Debt burden, Population 
density, Tenure in office, Press circulation p.c., and Percent educated are included in the regressions fitted separately 
on either side of the zero threshold and fully interacted with the forcing variable.
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 revenue-sharing, taxes, and intergovernmental grants) and with the debt burden (i.e., 
debt as a share of current revenues). We also include the average population density 
of the municipalities in the region, as smaller towns are much more reliant on grants 
of this kind than are big cities.
In columns  4–6, we report the results when including interactions with variables 
related to the incentives to discriminate faced by regional politicians. These alter-
native political mechanisms are not necessarily incompatible with the main story 
studied in this paper. The first factor is tenure in office (i.e., number of consecutive 
terms in office). It might be argued that the longer a party stays in office the more 
time the regional incumbent has to build alliances with local actors and the greater 
the likelihood of discrimination in the allocation of transfers. Also, informed voters 
might not be very tolerant of discrimination in transfers between places. To account 
for this, we include interactions between alignment and the level of press circulation 
and, also, with the percentage of educated residents. Finally, in the last column, we 
include all interactions at the same time. The results presented in this table suggest 
that the introduction of these additional interactions does not have any impact on 
the electoral competition results. The size of the coefficient and its statistical sig-
nificance remain unchanged. Therefore, the finding that party favoritism is greater 
in regions with less competitive elections is robust to the consideration of other 
plausible influences.
E. Robustness Checks
In this section, we discuss how our LATE and HLATE results are affected by 
changes in key aspects of the methodology. First, we show that the results are robust 
to changes in the way we compute the forcing variable (see column 1 of Table A.14). 
The results remain the same when using a forcing variable computed assuming that 
votes are transferred not only from abstention but also from the opposition bloc.19 
The results also remain unchanged when we exclude from the estimation municipal-
ities in which regional or local parties that are not easy to classify are represented on 
local councils (see columns 2 and 3).
Third, we show the results obtained when using other (more comprehensive) 
measures of alignment. We report the results for two of these measures (see columns 
4 and 5 of Table A.14): Partner alignment, defined as a dummy equal to one when 
any of the main partners in the coalition at both levels (i.e., not just the president 
or the mayor) belongs to the same party; and Bloc alignment (i.e., the party of the 
president and that of the mayor belong to the same ideological bloc). The results 
for the LATE are similar to those obtained in the main analysis. The HLATE is 
somewhat smaller in size and less precisely estimated. One possible interpretation 
of this difference is that when the party of the president and the mayor belong to a 
different party (although to the same regional coalition), the regional incumbent has 
19 The online Appendix includes the plots of the alignment status and of capital transfers against the alternative 
forcing variable (Figure A.3). These figures show that the size of the discontinuity at the threshold is not sensitive to 
the assumptions made when computing the forcing variable. The online Appendix also includes the histogram and 
the McCrary graph of the alternative forcing variable, again with no signs of manipulation (Figure A.4). 
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less room to reduce the favors made to aligned mayors in the face of an increase in 
regional competitiveness. Fourth, the results are also robust to restricting the sample 
only to concurrent elections (column 4).
Fifth, the results are also very similar when we use as a measure of regional 
electoral competition the seat shares of all the parties in the blocs of the president 
and the opposition (see Table A.15 in the online Appendix). It appears not to matter 
whether we use actual or hypothetical coalitions. The measure of regional elec-
toral competition that uses the seat shares of the two main parties does not work 
 particularly well. The problem with this measure is that it misclassifies some sit-
uations where although the first party has a clear advantage over the second, it is 
unlikely to win a majority in the parliament, and so to get enough support to win the 
regional presidency. Finally, the results regarding the size and statistical significance 
of the interaction term when we include time varying confounders also remain when 
using other estimation methods (global RD and DinD), as shown in Table A.16.
F. Alternative Stories
The results reported clearly indicate that regional governments discriminate in 
favor of aligned municipalities in the allocation of capital transfers. They also show 
that the differential amount of transfers allocated to aligned versus unaligned munic-
ipalities becomes larger as regional electoral competition drops. The results are sta-
tistically significant, quantitatively meaningful, and highly robust. These results 
are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model developed in Section I. 
However, we have to admit that these results also might be consistent with some 
alternative stories. In this section, we present an additional discussion and evidence 
that help discard this is actually the case.
Policy Preferences.—Regional governments, which are controlled by different 
parties, might have different preferences with respect to the policies to be imple-
mented. In addition, regional incumbents might not be perfectly informed about the 
policy preferences of mayors or might not be able to control the implementation of 
the projects funded. Imagine a  left-wing government that wants to prioritize spend-
ing on social services (e.g., building child care facilities) but suspects that  right-wing 
mayors will try to deviate the funds to other goals (e.g., road paving). If this is the 
case, the regional  left-wing government will naturally prefer to allocate more funds 
to his  co-partisans. Moreover, if differences in policy priorities were larger the less 
competitive elections are (i.e., the regional incumbent feels less compelled to please 
the median voter), it would be natural to expect that the bias toward  co-partisans will 
grow as regional electoral competition diminishes.
We think that this story is less likely to drive our results. Capital transfers are 
earmarked to very specific projects. The regional government specifies in the call 
the policy priorities (e.g., child care facilities, road paving, etc.), so if a municipality 
asks for funding for a policy that it is not on the list, the chances of getting funds 
are much lower. Also, the regional government only approves fully specified proj-
ects (the municipality has to apply with the actual plan of the new facility and the 
budget), and only disburses the money once there is proof that the works have been 
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completed. This means that the regional government should not worry about the 
possibility that the transfer is misallocated.
One way to test the validity of the policy preferences argument would be to see 
whether mayors aligned with the left shift the composition of their expenditure bud-
get toward programs that are more valued by the left as the level of electoral com-
petition increases. We have implemented such a test in the following way. We do 
not have information regarding the program destination of capital transfers, but we 
know the program composition of capital expenditures, which is what these trans-
fers are used for. With this information, we can compute the share of capital expen-
ditures allocated to social services, which are services that are supposedly a relative 
priority of the left. This disaggregated data is only available for the last two terms. 
During these two terms there is very little regional turnover from left to right or vice 
versa, meaning that it does not make much sense to try to identify our effect using 
time variation. Therefore, we show graphically the alignment effect on the share of 
social spending for Low and High regional competition elections in governments 
controlled by the Left versus the Right.
The results suggest that the share of expenditures in social services is not dis-
continuous at the threshold, irrespective of whether the regional government is on 
the left or on the right or on whether the regional election is competitive or not 
(see Figure A.5 in the online Appendix). We admit, however, that this piece of 
evidence might not be totally conclusive, given our reliance on just  cross-sectional 
variation. In addition, if the policy preferences stated in the call do not match 
those of the municipality, the local government may decide not to submit any pro-
posal. We cannot test this because we do not have information on the applications 
submitted.
Other Stories.—It might be that the regional incumbent wants to allocate more 
transfers to local governments controlled by the same party as hers because she 
expects  co-partisans to channel back some of the funds to her. For example, local 
governments may obtain kickbacks from firms undertaking public works that are 
then transferred to the regional or national party to help fund its electoral campaigns. 
Note, however, that it is not clear that such a scenario can be reconciled with our 
main prediction: lower electoral competition at the regional level reduces campaign 
finance needs and, hence, the need to use these unorthodox procedures.
It might be, however, that the regional incumbent simply expects to share in the 
rents generated by the local public works. A lower level of regional electoral compe-
tition could foster incentives to behave in this way (see, e.g., Svaleryd and Vlachos 
2009), so the main prediction in such a scenario and of our model would be essen-
tially the same. However, several complementary pieces of evidence suggest this is 
unlikely to be the case. First, we would expect extended periods in office to help in 
the building of the networks that politicians use to extract these rents, yet we have 
not found any evidence that tenure in office had any effect on party favoritism (see 
Table 3). Second, this alternative theory would not necessarily predict that the LATE 
should be larger than the ATE, which is what the comparison of our RD and DinD 
results tentatively suggests. Rather, this alternative theory suggests that the local 
mayors that are best able to extract bribes from public works firms, and to share 
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them with comrades at higher levels, are precisely those that won the local election 
by the greatest margin (and so have no fear of losing the next election if they extract 
too many rents or if they are caught in a corruption scandal). It could be shown 
that in this type of model the ATE could in fact be greater than the LATE: transfers 
would jump at the threshold (a mayor trusts her  co-partisans more than the opposi-
tion) but continue growing as aligned mayors become more and more popular. We 
admit, however, that these pieces of evidence are far from conclusive, and that addi-
tional work might be needed in order to disentangle this story from ours.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined the way in which competition in regional elec-
tions can affect the incentives of  regional-level incumbents to discriminate in favor of 
aligned municipalities. We first present a simple theoretical model in which regional 
incumbents face a  trade-off when deciding how to allocate grants to  lower-layer 
governments. On the one hand, they are concerned about winning the next regional 
election; on the other, they wish to maximize the number of aligned mayors, which 
in the long run should help the regional incumbent increase her political capital and 
win future elections. The main hypothesis derived from this model is that when 
the regional incumbent performed particularly well in the previous election, and 
so believes her reelection prospects to be high, she can concentrate her efforts on 
targeting more resources toward her party comrades.
To test the above hypothesis, we have used capital transfers from regional to 
local governments in Spain and applied a “fuzzy” RD design that we adapt to a PR 
electoral system. We find that aligned municipalities, on average, obtain 102 percent 
more transfers per capita than unaligned municipalities. Such a difference would 
enable local governments to increase their investments by 21 percent. Moreover, the 
initial RD design is modified, as in Becker, Egger, and von Ehrlich (2013), in order 
to obtain local average treatment effects that are heterogeneous across regions with 
different levels of competition in regional elections. The results suggest that party 
favoritism is more prevalent when the president’s party won the previous election 
by a large seat margin. In regions with low electoral competition (one standard devi-
ation above the average), aligned mayors receive 166 percent more transfers than 
unaligned mayors. This effect falls to 52 percent in regions with a higher level of 
competition. The differences are even larger in the most extreme cases. This result 
suggests that the level of competition in the elections influences the degree of party 
favoritism: in places where the elections are largely uncontested, the degree of party 
favoritism is massive, whereas in places where elections are strongly contested 
favoritism disappears.
Our results shed light on the mechanisms responsible for the extreme degree of 
party favoritism in the allocation of transfers. Some complementary sources of evi-
dence suggest that regional incumbents pursue a  long-term strategy, seeking to win 
additional mayoralties and strengthening their power base in order to improve their 
performance in future elections. The evidence here, however, is merely suggestive 
and any conclusions should be drawn with extreme care. For the time being, we 
know that discretionary transfers are subject to extreme levels of party favoritism 
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and that electoral competition matters, but more research is required to obtain a full 
understanding of the motives behind this behavior.
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